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The three lines of defense model (TLoD) aims to provide a simple and effective way
to improve coordination and enhance communications on risk management and con-
trol by clarifying the essential roles and duties of different governance functions.
Without effective coordination of these governance functions, work can be dupli-
cated or key risks may be missed or misjudged. To address these challenges, profes-
sional standards recommend that the chief audit executive (CAE) coordinates
activities with other internal and external governance stakeholders (assurance pro-
viders). We consider survey responses from 415 CAEs from Austria, Germany, and
Switzerland to analyze determinants that help to implement the TLoD without any
challenges and to explore the extent of (coordination) challenges between the inter-
nal audit function and the respective governance stakeholders. Our results show a
great variance in the extent of coordination challenges dependent on different deter-
minants and the respective governance stakeholder.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
This study analyses determinants and challenges between different
governance stakeholders in implementing the three lines of defense
model (TLoD), considering survey responses from chief audit execu-
tives (CAEs) from Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. The TLoD has
been cited extensively as an effective model to use for risk
management (e.g., Decaux & Sarens, 2015; EY, 2013; IFAC/IIA, 2018;
IIA, 2013; KPMG, 2012; PWC, 2017). It has been accepted as a best
practice for listed companies and as a required organizational model
by banking regulators and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion in regulated financial institutions as a response to deficient risk
management in the financial crisis (Arndorfer & Minto, 2015; Bantleon
et al., 2017). According to the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) posi-
tion paper (2013), the TLoD provides a simple and effective way to
enhance communications on risk management and control by clarify-
ing essential roles and duties. In particular, management control is the
first line of defense in risk management, the various risk control and
compliance oversight functions established by management are the
second line of defense, and independent assurance provided by the
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internal audit function (IAF) is the third line of defense. For financial
institutions, the Bank of International Settlement proposes the exter-
nal auditor and the regulator as the fourth line of defense
(Arndorfer & Minto, 2015). We interpret governing bodies and senior
management as the primary governance stakeholders served by the
“lines,” and they are the parties best positioned to help ensure that
the TLoD is reflected in the organization's risk management and con-
trol processes (IIA, 2013). From a theoretical point of view, the TLoD
can be understood as an organizational framework that helps to
reduce potential information asymmetries in the context of the
principal-agent theory. Thus, the different lines of defense reduce the
information asymmetries between the principals and agents through-
out the different hierarchy levels and minimize the risks of discretion-
ary decisions from the agents.
However, in clearly demanding a high level of independence for
each line, there are obvious tradeoffs that might affect the effective-
ness and efficiency of the whole risk management function. In particu-
lar, a lack of coordination might reduce the positive effect of the
three distinct lines because tasks and resources of each line are not
independent from those of the other lines. Coordination theory states
that task-related and resource-related dependencies require manage-
ment by coordination mechanisms (Crowston, 1997; Malone
et al., 1999; Malone & Crowston, 1994). Empirical research shows
that coordination mechanisms have a positive impact on performance
that is mediated by relational coordination; this holds for structured
and for unstructured coordination mechanisms, which can be
explained by the fact that both types provide opportunities for inter-
action (Gittell, 2002).
In line with this reasoning, research suggests that the lack of coor-
dination between the three lines might lead to inefficiencies such as
assurance fatigue, assurance gaps, or inadequate reporting that nega-
tively impact governance. For example, these inefficiencies hinder
boards' exercise of their oversight role and endanger implementation
efforts (Decaux & Sarens, 2015; IIA, 2013; KPMG, 2012; Roussy &
Rodrigue, 2018; Sarens, Decaux, & Lenz, 2012). Research targeting
the banking industry found that the three lines have had difficulties
coordinating the required responsibilities without overlapping each
other (Institute of International Finance, 2014; Luburic, 2017;
Udding, 2016). The UK Parliamentary Commission on Banking Stan-
dards comments in its June 2013 report that the TLoD is a “theory
(that) appears to have lent undeserved credibility to some chaotic sys-
tems. … and indeed provided a wholly misplaced sense of security”
(UK Parliament, 2013, p. 18). In the same vein, audit firms (EY, 2013;
KPMG, 2012; PWC, 2017) confirm that firms suffer from a not well-
coordinated TLoD. Professional bodies recognize that the implemen-
tation of the TLoD might be deficient (IIA UK and Ireland, 2010; Insti-
tute of International Finance, 2014; Institute of Directors, 2016;
IIA, 2018; IIA, 2019). In particular, in December 2018 the IIA launched
a global review of theTLoD considering the need for “horizontal coor-
dination” and communication in the approach of risk and opportuni-
ties (IIA, 2018). In October 2019 the IIA published a report about the
public exposure findings, as further critiques of the recent TLoD are
named: duplication of work, “unrealistic expectations of the second
and third lines can give false comfort to the first line,” description of
internal audit “does not characterize its full potential for being a
trusted advisor and contributing to the creation of value,” and inap-
propriate naming of the model (Nicholson, 2019).
Professional standards recommend that the CAE coordinates
activities with other internal and external governance stakeholders
(assurance providers) (IPPF 2050; IIA, 2017). Already from 2012, vari-
ous IIA Practice Guides and Standards address the need for coordina-
tion.1 In the same vein, standard setters and research promote the
concept of combined assurance to improve assurance provider coordi-
nation (Institute of Directors, 2009; IIA UK and Ireland, 2010;
Decaux & Sarens, 2015; Institute of Directors, 2016). This is in line
with the implication of coordination theory that overlapping tasks
require coordination mechanisms to reach agreements that are
acceptable to all involved parties (Crowston, 1997). Empirical research
has shown that combined assurance has the potential to avoid dupli-
cation of work and gaps in risk coverage and to improve internal audit
(Azzali & Mazza, 2018). However, still in 2019, the IIA TLoD Review
reveals in the “Report on the Public Exposure Findings June-
September 2019” (published October 2019) that one main area that
requires improvement is “encouragement for communication, coordi-
nation, and collaboration across the lines to avoid silos”
(Nicholson, 2019, p. 13). The report also shows an explicit agreement
that an appropriate role for internal audit is “to play a lead role in facil-
itating coordination, integration and alignment across the lines”
(Nicholson, 2019, p. 10).
Overall, standard setters and research have identified various
challenges in implementing the TLoD that are documented previously.
However, critique is biased on challenges and does not refer to suc-
cessful implementation. Thus, it remains unclear under which circum-
stances the TLoD can be implemented effectively and efficiently.
Research indicates that several determinants might influence TLoD
implementation efforts, in particular, company characteristics (such as
size/complexity, industry, e.g., Nuijten et al., 2015; Carcello et
al., 2018; Zhou et al., 2019), IAF characteristics (such as the focus of
IAF activities and IAF quality, e.g., Sarens & De Beelde, 2006; Eulerich
et al., 2018; Eulerich et al., 2019) and the relation to its main stake-
holders (e.g., management and supervisory board, e.g., Sarens & De
Beelde, 2006; Eulerich et al., 2018; Eulerich et al., 2019). This helps us
to differentiate between two groups of companies dealing with the
TLoD: one group that faces no challenges in implementation versus
the other group that does face challenges in implementation. There-
fore, we formulate our first research question to identify circum-
stances under which the TLoD is implemented without facing
challenges.
In a second step, we deepen our understanding of the nature of
the challenges by differentiating which governance stakeholders are
affected by incomplete implementation efforts. We still consider
influencing determinants as identified in our first research question.
Therefore, we formulate the second research question to analyze the
relationship between the IAF and the respective governance stake-
holder for each potential governance stakeholder when implementing
the TLoD. This analysis is also in line with the view that IAF
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effectiveness is a matter of stakeholder perception (Roussy, Barbe, &
Raimbault, 2020). The governance stakeholders under consideration
are risk management, the compliance function, the C-Level manage-
ment, the supervisory board, the regulator, and the external auditor.
We therefore contribute to research by exploring the elements of the
TLoD implementation black box.
For our sample, we surveyed 415 CAEs whose answers represent
the third line of defense. This approach provides valuable insights into
the overall implementation status of the TLoD and respective chal-
lenges because the third line monitors the effectiveness of the other
lines of defense and is responsible for coordination tasks (IIA, 2017).
Our findings show that almost all sample companies have
implemented the TLoD, whereby roughly the half do not report any
potential challenges while implementing the TLoD. The latter compa-
nies are characterized inter alia by having a higher probability of being
listed as well as having a good collaboration with the C-Level and
supervisory board. Challenges in implementing the TLoD are more
likely for companies in the finance sector. With regard to different
governance stakeholders, we, for instance, find that the IAF of listed
companies faces fewer coordination challenges with the board and
external auditors. In the finance industry, coordination challenges
between the IAF and the compliance function, the regulator, and the
external auditor are more pronounced than in other industries. These
heterogeneous results enable us to identify and describe coordination
challenges under various conditions.
Our study contributes to literature in at least four ways. First, our
empirical findings confirm that the TLoD is implemented in most of
our sample companies. Second, we identify determinants that influ-
ence the implementation of the TLoD in a positive or negative way.
Third, we generate additional insights whether specific factors deter-
mine challenges between the IAF and a governance function. Finally,
our results allow the IIA and the national chapters to rethink the pros
and cons of the model, especially in the current phase of discussing
the update of theTLoD (IIA, 2020).
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The next
section presents related research and develops the research ques-
tions. The third section describes the sample and the methodology,
while the fourth section provides the results, robustness checks, and
their interpretation. Finally, the fifth section discusses the outcome
and limitations of this study, providing avenues for future research.
2 | LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH
QUESTIONS DEVELOPMENT
Research on the implementation of theTLoD and related challenges is
rare. Analyzing the financial crisis, Chambers and Odar (2015, p. 49)
conclude that the “three lines of defence approach has not been
entirely effective and has given a false sense of assurance.” In the
same vein, the Common Body of Knowledge (CBOK) (IIA, 2015) data-
base, that is, the world‘s largest ongoing study of the internal audit
profession, finds evidence for imperfect implementation efforts. It
should be noted that in Europe 12% of the respondents are not
familiar with the TLoD, increasing to 20% globally (Huibers, 2015).
Udding (2016) surveyed Dutch banks, concluding that the design of
the TLoD is valid but various problems can be identified in the imple-
mentation and operation. He identified five inhibitors that undermine
the successful implementation of the TLoD. These are ambiguous
responsibilities, lack of first line accountability, lines operating in silos,
lack of countervailing power, and a static model with a dynamic envi-
ronment. Other studies concentrate on the risk function and single
components, such as the risk culture (e.g., Braumann, 2018). Analyzing
central banks, Luburic (2017) confirms that the TLoD primarily
requires good communication between the lines. He argues for
strengthening each line, which itself increases the number of connec-
tions and topics for communication. Therefore, vertical and horizontal
coordination of all aspects of risk management is one of the key con-
ditions for achieving a successful implementation and functioning of
the TLoD. Davies and Zhivitskaya's (2018) analysis of the criticisms of
theTLoD suggests that ever-increasing layers of oversight may endan-
ger business efficiency and customer service. Moreover, the existence
of three separate groups who are supposed to ensure proper conduct
toward risks might have led to a false sense of security. They ask for a
proper implementation strategy such as clarity about the borders
between the three lines and a clear understanding of the relationship
between the first and second lines.
In addition, audit firms confirm that firms suffer from a not well-
coordinated TLoD. This might lead to the following challenges
(EY, 2013; KPMG, 2012; PWC, 2017): inconsistent and multiple
reporting, gaps in risk coverage, siloed risk functions, business fatigue,
confusion on the organization's risk profile, and layers of redundant
controls. Professional bodies ask for coordination among various
assurance providers but recognize that the implementation is rare
because of various challenges (ECIIA, 2009; IIA UK and Ireland, 2010;
Paterson, 2011; Institute of Directors, 2016). Additionally, the COSO
Enterprise Risk Management–Integrated Framework also underlines
the necessity to coordinate the “activities spanning risk, compliance,
control, and even governance” to manage the cost of risk manage-
ment (COSO, 2017).
The King III Report on Governance for South Africa 2009
(Institute of Directors, 2009; PWC, 2010) introduced the approach
of combined assurance to improve coordination. The King IV
Report on Governance for South Africa 2016 (Institute of Direc-
tors, 2016) confirmed the concept of combined assurance but
admitted that the concept needed to evolve to become more use-
ful and effective. In 2017, the basics concept was integrated into
the International Professional Practice Framework (IPPF) by includ-
ing Standard 2050 “Coordination and Reliance.” However, there
are currently barriers for the IAF to rely on others (lack of maturity
by the first and second lines of defense, concerns about impairing
the independence and objectivity of the IAF, lack of alignment in
the definition of risk and risk management, lack of prescriptive
guidance for evaluating the lines of defense) (Pett & Poritz, 2018).
Decaux and Sarens (2015) show in a multiple case study that no
organization seems to have attained a mature combined assurance
implementation.
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Overall, standard setters and research have identified various
challenges in implementing the TLoD that are documented previously
and show the necessity of a coordinated approach. This is in line with
predictions of coordination theory. In particular, a lack of coordination
might reduce the positive effect of the three separate lines because
tasks and resources of each line are not independent from those of
the other lines. Therefore, task-related and resource-related depen-
dencies require management by coordination mechanisms
(Crowston, 1997; Malone et al., 1999; Malone & Crowston, 1994).
Still, it remains unclear under which circumstances the model can
be implemented effectively and efficiently, and therefore without
challenges. Research indicates that several determinants might influ-
ence implementation efforts taking effective coordination into
account. These determinants can be differentiated into company char-
acteristics (e.g., Carcello et al., 2018; Nuijten et al., 2015; Zhou
et al., 2019), IAF characteristics, and relations to stakeholders
(e.g., Eulerich et al., 2018; Eulerich et al., 2019; Sarens & De
Beelde, 2006). We follow this line of research and cover all three
categories—company characteristics, IAF characteristics, and relations
to stakeholders—by including the following central determinants in
our investigation: First, company characteristics such as the size and
complexity of the organization influence the need for more monitor-
ing. We therefore proxy these characteristics by full-time equivalent
of IAF employees, listing status, and the organization belonging to the
finance sector. Second, IAF characteristics are influencing factors from
the supply side. In particular, the quality of the IAF proxied by the
level of conformance to the International Professional Practice Frame-
work, percentage of assurance activities as an indication of the focus
of IAF's tasks, and, percentage of unplanned audits can be seen as
determining factors to influence implementation challenges of the
TLoD (Eulerich et al., 2018; Eulerich et al., 2019). Third, the intensity
of use of the IAF's work by the supervisory board and by the manage-
ment board respectively might influence the interaction between the
IAF and other governance providers as proposed by Carcello
et al. (2018) or Eulerich et al. (2018). Accordingly, we formulate a
research question in order to identify and describe cases where the
TLoD is implemented successfully. This helps us to differentiate
between two groups of companies dealing with the TLoD: one group
that faces no challenges in implementation versus the other group
that faces challenges in implementation. Based on the discussion
above, we formulate our first research question as follows:
RQ1: Which determinants lead to a TLoD implementation without
challenges?
As a second step, we aim to analyze when the TLoD is
implemented with coordination challenges between different gover-
nance stakeholders. We anchor on coordination theory that predicts
for both task-related and resource-related dependencies that manage-
ment need to establish effective coordination mechanisms
(Crowston, 1997; Malone et al., 1999; Malone & Crowston, 1994).
Empirical research confirms that coordination mechanisms have a pos-
itive impact on performance that is mediated by relational
coordination. This holds for all types of interaction between lines and
includes structured and unstructured coordination mechanisms
(Gittell, 2002). One important feature is the enactment of coordina-
tion in enabling shared interpretations (Claggett & Karahanna, 2018).
These forms of relational coordination could also be interpreted as a
communication network that helps coordination in two ways: by
informing each stage about earlier stages, and by creating common
knowledge within each stage (Suk-Young Chwe, 2000).
Applying this idea to an internal control and risk management
environment, research suggests that challenges are caused by various
coordination deficiencies (e.g., Luburic, 2017; Udding, 2016). We aim
to explore how these coordination challenges affect different gover-
nance stakeholders to understand potential tradeoffs between the
independence of each line of defense and coordination efforts. We
expect that specific determinants might drive the implementation
effort of a company. For example, Sarens and De Beelde (2006) found
that the IAF looks for senior management support in order to work
effectively. Abbott et al. (2012) document the positive effect of coor-
dination efforts between internal and external audit. Munro and Stew-
ard (2010) document that involvement in consulting of the IAF
impacts reliance on work undertaken and the use of internal auditors
as assistants for control evaluation by the external auditor. As profes-
sional standards recommend that the CAE coordinates activities with
other internal and external governance stakeholders (assurance pro-
viders) (IPPF 2050, IIA, 2017), we formulate our second research
question asking for challenges in implementing theTLoD between the
IAF and the respective governance stakeholder controlling for various
determinants:
RQ2: Which determinants lead to challenges between governance
stakeholders and the IAF when implementing theTLoD?
This analysis helps us to shed light on the TLoD implementation
black box. We split the second research question into six
subquestions, analyzing in each subquestion the relation between IAF
and the respective governance stakeholder, namely, risk management,
the compliance function, the supervisory board, the C-Level, the regu-
lator, and the external auditor. Thus, we run six different models to
answer our second research question.
3 | DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1 | Survey and sample
To answer our research questions, we use a proprietary sample of
European CAEs. Together with the Austrian, German, and Swiss IIA,2
we surveyed only CAEs as we assume CAEs to be knowledgeable
about coordination and communication deficiencies between the dif-
ferent lines of defense, as well as between each line and the
governing bodies and management because they are responsible for
auditing the effectiveness of the other lines of defense (IIA, 2013). In
addition, they regularly communicate with management and
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governance bodies about risk management and internal control effec-
tiveness (IIA Standard 2060: Reporting to Senior Management and
the Board).
We invited the participants via email or postal letter to participate
in an online survey, since this online solution offered easy access to
the questionnaire. The survey was available for one month (January
2017). Overall, the national IIAs sent the survey invitation to 1,916
participants, all of which are CAEs, from different organizations. The
1,916 CAEs from the participant pool were identified based on the
members and personal contacts of the national IIAs. Of those, 415 par-
ticipants provided usable responses to the questions that are relevant
for this study (response rate of 24.7%). The participants represent a
broad variety of firm sizes and industry types. All data received was
reviewed and cleaned to ensure responses were entered appropriately
and interpreted correctly.
3.2 | Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for our sample. Our sample
consists of companies from different industries and with a different
listing status. Roughly a third of the surveyed CAEs work for compa-
nies that are based in the finance industry (30.84%) and are therefore
subject to increased supervision and stricter regulation. Less than half
of our sample is made up of CAEs working for listed companies
(40.24%). LN_IAFStaff is the natural logarithm of full-time equivalents;
LN_IAFStaff averages 1.90. Most of the participants report that they
work in conformance with the IPPF, with an average of 3.65. Looking
at stakeholder relationships, with a mean of 4.08 on a 5-point Likert
scale, Intensity_CLevel illustrates that on average the IAF's work is
used intensively by the company's management board. In comparison,
regarding the relationship to the supervisory board, the average is
only 1.90. The focus of the participating IAFs is especially on assur-
ance, with 80.43%; 15.54% of their annual audits are unplanned.
45.3% of the CAEs report that there were no challenges
implementing the TLoD. The main source of coordination challenges
between governance stakeholders can be attributed to the second
line. The CAEs report a stake of challenges of 15.18% with risk man-
agement and 14.94% with compliance. This is followed with great dis-
tance by challenges with the external auditor (7.95%). Challenges with
the supervisory board seem to be a rare event (3.86%), whereas the
C-Level (6.51%) and the regulator (6.02%) are in between.
Tables 2 and 3 present the cross-correlations. They show that
there are no high levels of correlation between the independent vari-
ables of the model as all values are well below the threshold
suggested by literature (Kennedy, 2008). Moreover, the variance infla-
tion factor (VIF) is employed to check for collinearity between the
explanatory variables. All variables have a VIF below the rec-
ommended maximum value of 5 (Rogerson, 2001). Thus, it is noted
that the collinearity of variables does not seem to be an issue for this
study.
Analyzing Table 4, we observe that 87.95% have implemented
the TLoD in their organizations. Looking at potential company charac-
teristics, we observe that 96.09% of the companies from the finance
industry have implemented the TLoD. The TLoD is mandatory in the
finance industry in most cases. This finding also covers the fact that
the TLoD is an organizational model required by banking and insur-
ance regulators and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
Looking at the listing status, we find a comparable situation with
95.21% of the listed companies that have implemented the TLoD.
TABLE 1 Summary statistics
Variable Observations M SD Min Max
Dependent variables
TLoDNoChallenges 415 .453012 .4983881 0 1
TLoDChallengeRiskManagement 415 .1518072 .359267 0 1
TLoDChallengeCompliance 415 .1493976 .3569102 0 1
TLoDChallengeC-Level 415 .0650602 .2469298 0 1
TLoDChallengeSupervisoryBoard 415 .0385542 .1927624 0 1
TLoDChallengeRegulator 415 .060241 .2382199 0 1
TLoDChallengeExternalAuditor 415 .0795181 .2708722 0 1
Independent variables
LN_IAFStaff 395 1.895498 1.255768 0 7.20786
Listing 415 .4024096 .4909755 0 1
Finance 415 .3084337 .4624041 0 1
ConformanceIPPF 379 3.651715 1.541341 0 5
Intensity_SB 415 1.901205 1.531433 0 5
Intensity_CLevel 393 4.081425 .9386736 0 5
AssurancePct 392 80.43112 14.26585 10 100
PctUnplanned 372 15.54123 52.88918 1.666667 100
Note. Refer to the Appendix for variable definitions.
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Thus, companies from non-finance industries or companies that are
not listed are less likely to implement the TLoD. Since the overall
acceptance is on a high level, we analyze potential determinants that
drive the implementation of theTLoD without any challenges.
3.3 | Model
We use two different empirical models to investigate our research
questions 1 and 2. In order to explore the first research question, that
is, “Which determinants lead to a TLoD implementation without chal-
lenges?” we apply a logistic regression model, since the dependent
variable is a dummy variable. The equation reads as follows:
TLoDNoChallenges= β1LN_IAFStaff + β2Listing + β3Finance+ β4ConformanceIPPF
+ β5Intensity_SB+ β6Intensity_CLevel+ β7AssurancePct+ β8PctUnplanned+ ε
ð1Þ
Variable definitions are described in the Appendix. Each variable is
based on a specific question of the survey. The dependent variable of
interest is TLoDNoChallenges, a binary variable coded 1 in the case
where there are no challenges while implementing the TLoD; 0 other-
wise. Furthermore, the model includes eight independent variables
capturing factors that are likely to influence the implementation with-
out challenges. Of these eight variables, the three variables
LN_IAFStaff, Listing, and Finance account for company characteristics.
The variable LN_IAFStaff represents the natural logarithm of the num-
ber of people employed in the IAF given as the full-time equivalent
and including administrative workers as well as supervisors. This vari-
able is operationalized following Carcello et al. (2018), who use the
number of internal audit staff. The variable LN_IAFStaff thus acts as a
proxy for investments in the IAF due to the larger (smaller) size of
the company and the related increased (decreased) need for moni-
toring. Listing is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the com-
pany is listed, as used by Arena and Azzone (2009). Finance is a
dummy variable with the value of 1 if the company belongs to the
finance industry (including banks, financial institutions, and insur-
ance companies), used as an indicator variable similar to Abbott
et al. (2012). We include ConformanceIPPF to measure whether
the IAF follows the international professional practice framework
and as a proxy for IAF quality. It is measured on a 5-point Likert
scale from 1 “totally not in conformance with the IPPF” to 5 “full
conformance with the IPPF.” To examine the IAF's relationship
with its main stakeholders (Chief Executive Level [C-Level] and
Supervisory Board or Audit Committee [SB/AC]), the model
includes the variables Intensity_SB and Intensity_CLevel. The inten-
sity variables are measured on a 5-point Likert scale from very low
to very high and measure the intensity with which the manage-
ment board or the SB/AC use the IAF's work. This measurement
can also be found in other studies (e.g., Carcello et al., 2018;
Eulerich et al., 2018). Furthermore, we use the variables
AssurancePct, measuring the percentage of audit-related tasks, and
PctUnplanned, measuring the percentage of unplanned audits, as
additional measures of the IAF characteristics and to understand
the focus of IAF activities.
As a next step, we modify this approach and aim to analyze when
the TLoD is implemented with coordination challenges between dif-
ferent governance stakeholders. Therefore, we replace our dependent
variable with six different variables that capture different governance
stakeholders as a potential source of implementation challenges. The
following equation represents our approach to answer the second
TABLE 2 Cross-correlation matrix TLoDNoChallenges
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
TLoDNoChallenges (1) 1.0000
LN_IAFStaff (2) .1613 1.0000
.0013
Listing (3) .1910 .2760 1.0000
.0001 .0000
Finance (4) .0002 .1937 .1861 1.0000
.9975 .0001 .0001
ConformanceIPPF (5) .1329 .1992 .2335 .0914 1.0000
.0096 .0001 .0000 .0756
Intensity_SB (6) .2360 .2272 .1622 .2273 .1372 1.0000
.0000 .0000 .0009 .0000 .0075
Intensity_CLevel (7) .1944 .1088 .1203 .0058 .2222 .2796 1.0000
.0001 .0310 .0171 .9093 .0000 .0000
AssurancePct (8) .1399 .2682 .1324 .1833 .1917 .0281 −.0152 1.0000
.0055 .0000 .0087 .0003 .0002 .5786 .7647
PctUnplanned (9) −.0641 .0399 −.0328 .0127 −.1034 .0770 −.0288 .0503 1.0000
.2175 .4423 .5277 .8073 .0508 .1383 .5800 .3335
Note. Pearson correlation coefficient, p-value in italics. Refer to the Appendix for variable definitions.
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research question, that is, “Which determinants lead to challenges
between governance stakeholders and the IAF when implementing
theTLoD?”
Dif_Gov_Stakeholdersi = β1LN_IAFStaff + β2Listing + β3Finance
+ β4ConformanceIPPF + β5Intensity_SB+ β6Intensity_CLevel+ β7AssurancePct
+ β8PctUnplanned+ ε
ð2Þ
We apply an empirical approach similar to Model 1 but change the
dependent variables based on specific IAF stakeholders, namely, risk
management, the compliance function, the supervisory board, the C-
Level, the regulator, and the external auditor. Thus, we run six differ-
ent models to answer our second research question. That said, in our
Model 2 Different_Gov_Stakeholder has to be replaced with one of
the six specific dependent variables that captures the corresponding
stakeholder.
4 | EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1 | Regression results
Table 5 presents the results of the logistic regression
Equation (1) that is used to investigate our first research question
when the TLoD is implemented without any challenges. The overall
model is significant (p-value < .001), with a pseudo R2 of .0950.
We include 356 observations in our model. We find that compa-
nies that have no challenges in implementing the TLoD are charac-
terized by a high probability of being listed (.7291***), a relatively
high usage intensity of audit reports by the supervisory board
(.2206***) and the C-Level (.3337**), as well as a high percentage
of assurance activities (.0166*). Interestingly, we find a negative
significant effect for our industry dummy Finance (−.6066**),
suggesting that companies in the finance industry are more likely
to face challenges when implementing the TLoD than companies
from other industries. The variables LN_IAFStaff, ConformanceIPPF,
and PctUnplanned per year do not show any significant effects.
The result related to the IAF size is remarkable, because this deter-
minant does not drive successful TLoD implementation. If we
assume that larger organizations are more complex, more resources
seem to mitigate their impact on implementation challenges. Fur-
thermore, results indicate that the percentage of unplanned audits
does not have an influence on the TLoD implementation without
challenges. Thus, the TLoD implementation seems not to be
affected by the required flexibility of the IAF in the sense of
unplanned audits or—in other words—TLoD seems not to reduce
the flexibility and agility of the IAF.
In our second logistic regression Equation (2), we analyze the
potential challenges between the IAF and different governance stake-
holders. Table 6 presents our results for the specific logistic regres-
sions between the IAF and different governance stakeholders, which
addresses our second research question. Our model for coordination
challenges between IAF and risk management only shows a significant
negative effect on Intensity_CLevel (−.3290**). Thus, an IAF with a
strong interaction with the C-Level is less likely to face coordination
challenges between the IAF and the risk management function when
implementing the TLoD. This conforms to the idea of the influence of
the tone from the top to effective implementation efforts confirmed
by literature (Hansen et al., 2009).
The second model applies to coordination challenges between
the IAF and the compliance function as our dependent variable. We
find a significant positive effect for the industry dummy Finance
(.8813***), suggesting that companies from the finance industry are
more likely to face challenges with the compliance function in the
context of TLoD implementation. This conforms to banking and assur-
ance regulation, where the compliance function understands its tasks
broader and might include not only process-integrated controls but
also independent assurance tasks. Moreover, the fourth line of
defense model promoted by the Bank for International Settlement
(Arndorfer & Minto, 2015) recommends that the compliance function
directly reports to the supervisory function and the board. This might
cause coordination challenges with the IAF. Companies in which the
IAF has a high level of conformance with the IPPF are more likely to
face coordination challenges between the IAF and the compliance
function in the context of the TLoD (.2009*). If the supervisory board
uses IAF reports more intensively, we observe a negative significant
effect on challenges with the compliance function (−.2238**). Put dif-
ferently, IAFs with a higher level of cooperation with the supervisory
board are less likely to face problems with the implementation of
theTLoD.
Our third model analyzes determinants of coordination challenges
between the IAF and the C-Level. The only significant effect that can
be observed is the intensity of using IAF reports by the C-Level itself
(−.6582***). The result suggests that when the C-Level uses the IAF's
reports more intensively it is less likely that challenges with the imple-
mentation of the TLoD will be faced. This confirms again the idea of
the influence on the tone from the top to effective implementation
efforts (Hansen et al., 2009). If top management promotes the TLoD,
challenges in implementing theTLoD are less likely (Lenz et al., 2014).
TABLE 4 Company characteristics and TLoD implementation
Non-finance Finance Total Not Listed Listed Total
TLoD Not Implemented 15.68% 3.91% 12.05% 16.94% 4.79% 12.05%
TLoD Implemented 84.32% 96.09% 87.95% 83.06% 95.21% 87.95%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
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Using the supervisory board as a second main stakeholder in
our fourth model, we find a significant negative effect for the list-
ing status (−1.3735*), suggesting that IAFs in listed companies are
less likely to face coordination challenges between the IAF and the
supervisory board. Furthermore, we find a significant negative
effect when the IAF has a stronger assurance focus for its activi-
ties (−.0363**). Both results conform to the idea that the imple-
mentation of the 8th EU Directive has risen the awareness of the
supervisory board and the audit committee to monitor the effec-
tiveness of the internal control system for listed companies
(Bantleon et al., 2011).
The fifth model focuses on the regulator as a stakeholder and
analyzes determinants of challenges with the regulator. Especially in
the finance industry, it is more likely to face challenges when
implementing the TLoD between the IAF and the regulator
(2.9815***). This can be expected as the financial industry faces a
TABLE 5 Logistic regression
Dependent variable TLoDNoChallenges
Coef. SD z P>z 95% CI
LN_IAFStaff .1083 .1013 1.0700 .2850 [−.0903; .3069]
Listing .7291*** .2460 2.9600 .0030 [.2470; 1.2113]
Finance −.6066** .2679 −2.2600 .0240 [−1.1317; −.0815]
ConformanceIPPF .0378 .0794 .4800 .6340 [−.1179; .1935]
Intensity_SB .2206*** .0826 2.6700 .0080 [.0587; .3825]
Intensity_CLevel .3337** .1409 2.3700 .0180 [.0576; .6098]
AssurancePct .0166* .0088 1.8800 .0600 [−.0007; .0339]
PctUnplanned −.0097 .0092 −1.0600 .2880 [−.0277; .0082]
Pseudo R2 .0950
Observations 356
5a: Logistic Regression (Finance Industry)
Coef. SD z P>z 95% CI
LN_IAFStaff −.0256 .1835 −.1400 .8890 [−.3852; .3339]
Listing .5019 .4264 1.1800 .2390 [−.3339; 1.3376]
ConformanceIPPF .0600 .1454 .4100 .6800 [−.2250; .3449]
Intensity_SB .2340 .1581 1.4800 .1390 [−.0758; .5437]
Intensity_CLevel .3550 .2780 1.2800 .2020 [−.1898; .8998]
AssurancePct −.0028 .0201 −.1400 .8910 [−.0422; .0367]
PctUnplanned −.0120 .0141 −.8500 .3970 [−.0340; .0157]
Pseudo R2 .0600
Observations 112
5b: Logistic Regression (Non-Finance Industry)
Coef. SD z P>z 95% CI
LN_IAFStaff .1811 .1280 1.4100 .1570 [−.0699; .4320]
Listing .8268*** .3086 2.6800 .0070 [.2219; 1.4317]
ConformanceIPPF .0307 .0962 .3200 .7490 [−.1578; .2193]
Intensity_SB .2217** .0981 2.2600 .0240 [.0294; .4139]
Intensity_CLevel .2964* .1683 1.7600 .0780 [−.0334; .6262]
AssurancePct .0194* .0101 1.9200 .0550 [−.0004; .0393]
PctUnplanned -.0096 .0126 −.7700 .4430 [−.0343; .0150]
Pseudo R2 .1192
Observations .244
Note. Coefficient p-values are two-tailed and robust standard errors follow White (1980).
***p<.01,
**p<.05,
*p<.1. Refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. The regression is a logit. CI = Confidence Interval.
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stronger regulatory regime. However, those challenges are less likely
when the IAF has a stronger focus on assurance activities (−.0331*) or
when IAF reports are used more intensively by the C-Level (−.5585*).
Finally, our sixth model considers coordination challenges
between the IAF and the external auditor. Challenges between the
IAF and the external auditor in the context of the TLoD implementa-
tion are more likely to occur in the finance industry (.8513*). Given
the stronger regulatory regime for the finance industry, a higher need
for coordination could be expected. We observe that listed companies
are less likely to face challenges when implementing the TLoD with
the auditor (−.9915**), suggesting that listed companies already fulfill
certain characteristics, for example, due to transparency requirements.
Finally, we document a significant negative effect for the confor-
mance with the IPPF (−.2565**), which is consistent with the notion
that for a higher quality IAF, captured by the conformance with the
IPPF, challenges when implementing the TLoD with the auditor are
less likely. This conforms with research documenting under which
conditions external auditors rely on the internal auditor's work. For
example, Munro and Steward (2010) found for the use of internal
audit's work by external auditors that involvement in consulting
impacts reliance on work undertaken and the use of internal auditors
as assistants for control evaluation.
4.2 | Robustness checks
We have carried out additional analyses as robustness checks because
the activities and focus of the IAF in the regulated finance industry
sector compared to the less regulated non-finance sector are consid-
erably different. Therefore, we analyze the extent to which the results
of our overall models vary in separate subsamples. We divided our
sample into a finance (n = 112) and a non-finance (n = 244) subsample
and carried out the analyses described above again for the respective
subsamples.
Tables 5a and 5b show the results of the additional analyses con-
sidering the existence of implementation challenges in general. The
results of the subsample of non-finance companies remain qualita-
tively the same as for the entire sample. Thus, the listing status
(.8268***), the intensity that IAF reports are used by the supervisory
board (.2217**) and the C-Level (.2964*), as well as the percentage of
assurance activities performed by the IAF (.0194*) significantly influ-
ence the implementation effort. More specifically, the subsample of
non-finance companies that have no challenges in implementing the
TLoD is characterized by a high probability of being listed, a relatively
high usage intensity of audit reports by the supervisory board and the
C-Level, as well as a high percentage of assurance activities. For the
subsample of the finance industry, we do not find any significant
effects. Therefore, our independent variables do not explain variance
in the results. It seems that the influence of the specific industry regu-
lation for banks, insurance companies, and other financial service
companies for the implementation of the TLoD mitigates other
influencing factors. This is remarkable because the finance sector
reports challenges in implementing the TLoD. Therefore, the next
step—to shed light on the stakeholder relationship—should help us to
further analyze these differences.
Tables 6a (finance industry) and 6b (non-finance industry) pro-
ceed analogously to the approach described above and analyze the
potential challenges between different governance stakeholders.
Comparing the regression results of the whole sample with the
finance and the non-finance subsample, we find overall comparable
results with some remarkable deviations. We do not find any signifi-
cant effect concerning challenges with risk management. Challenges
with the compliance function are less likely to occur for the finance
subsample if the intensity that IAF reports are used by the supervisory
board is high (−.3576*). Thus, IAFs with a higher level of cooperation
with the supervisory board are less likely to face problems with the
implementation of the TLoD with the compliance function. Interest-
ingly, in terms of challenges with the compliance function for the vari-
able Intensity_CLevel a significant negative effect can now be found
for the non-finance subsample (−.3927*). The reported effect stem-
ming from the conformance with IPPF standards only holds for the
non-finance subsample (.3018*).
Challenges with the C-Level are weaker if the internal audit
reports are intensively used by the C-Level (−1.5429* for the finance
subsample and −.5988** for the non-finance sub-sample), conforming
the idea of the tone from the top. If top management promotes the
TLoD, challenges in implementing the TLoD are less likely. Addition-
ally, for the finance industry, challenges regarding the C-Level are less
likely to occur if the IAF is better staffed (−1.2725*). This effect could
not be documented in our main analysis in Model 2, in which we did
not observe any effect for IAF size with different governance stake-
holders. However, for the subsample of the finance industry, we find
that a larger IAF with more resources is less likely to face challenges
when implementing theTLoD with the C-Level. Regarding the cooper-
ation with the supervisory board, the positive effect of a higher per-
centage of assurance tasks can be confirmed for the finance
subsample (−.0802*) but not for the non-finance subsample. Thus, for
the finance subsample, a stronger focus on assurance tasks decreases
the likelihood of challenges in implementing the TLoD with the super-
visory board. This is consistent with the task of the supervisory board
to monitor the effectiveness of internal controls (Bantleon
et al., 2011).
Regarding challenges between the IAF and regulators, the results
of the finance subsample confirm the negative effect of the intensity
that IAF reports are used by the C-Level (−.9791**), whereas the non-
finance subsample shows significant negative results for the assurance
activities (−.0678*). For the analysis of the relation with the external
auditor, the significant negative effect of the listing status (−1.2607*)
and the conformance with IPPF standards (−.4012*) can be confirmed
for the finance subsample but not for the non-finance subsample.
These results support that non-finance listed companies already fulfill
certain characteristics, for example, due to transparency requirements,
that decrease the likelihood of challenges in implementing the TLoD
with the auditor. Furthermore, for non-finance companies with a
higher quality, IAF challenges when implementing the TLoD with the
auditor are less likely. Challenges with the external auditor in the
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finance subsample are less likely to occur if the intensity of using
internal reports by the C-Level is high (−.9568*).
Overall, this analysis helps us to understand which industry effect
drives the main results. Therefore, challenges in implementing the
TLoD between the IAF and different governance stakeholders can be
different due to the diverse regulatory background and the respective
governance structure.
5 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Overall, theTLoDmodel is widely accepted as a framework to structure
the position of the IAF and other governance stakeholders. Although
the benefits of the TLoD seem to be obvious at first sight, anecdotal
evidence from companies, audit firms, and professional bodies shows
various challenges when implementing themodel. In line with the impli-
cations of coordination theory (Crowston, 1997; Malone &
Crowston, 1994), coordination and communication between the IAF
and the other governance functions are one important challenge when
implementing the TLoD. Recognizing these challenges, in December
2018 the IIA launched a global review of the TLoD. The review con-
siders roles and responsibilities and the need for "horizontal coordina-
tion" and communication in the approach of risk and opportunities”
(IIA, 2018). The updated position paper (IIA, 2019) emphasizes the need
to update the model in order to overcome its shortcomings, for exam-
ple, “it is not equipped to reflect the current realities of modern organi-
zations” (IIA, 2019, p. 2). The proposal includes broadening the scope
beyond value protection to embrace value creation, the need for close
coordination among all contributors to avoid silos, and defining safe-
guards when enabling “blurring of the lines,” for example, when internal
audit responsibilities are extended beyond providing credible objective
assurance. In July 2020 the IIA announced the update of the TLoD
referred to as “Three LinesModel” (IIA, 2020; as a short description and
an initial assessment Chambers, 2020 and Tysiac, 2020).
Thus, our study contributes to answering a main question in the
TLoD discussion: when is the framework actually implemented with-
out any challenges and which specific determinants lead to challenges
between the different governance functions and stakeholders. Using
data from a large by-invitation-only survey sent out to CAEs, our
empirical models identify potential determinants of challenges during
the TLoD implementation and factors leading to an implementation
without these types of challenges. Our results show that the majority
of our sample has implemented theTLoD (nearly 90%). Forty-five per-
cent of our sample do not have any potential challenges while
implementing the TLoD. This is a positive finding for both the profes-
sion as well as the IIA and other standard setters.
On the one hand, listed companies, companies where the IAF, the
C-Level, and the supervisory board have a good relationship, and IAFs
with a stronger focus on assurance activities tend to have no chal-
lenges in the implementation. The size of the IAF and the percentage
of unplanned audits do not affect implementation challenges and
stakeholder relations. On the other hand, companies in the finance
sector often face challenges in the implementation compared to other
industries. This is even more interesting, since the finance sector is
often seen as an optimal environment for the implementation of strong
IAFs. Because of the regulatory rules and guidelines, the IAF should
always be the ultimate internal line of defense. Our results indicate that,
although there might be a regulatory need to implement an IAF as the
third line of defense, the participating CAEs see themselves in quite a
complicated position compared to the nonfinance colleagues.
To generate more insights, we run additional logistic regression
models, in which the challenges with the implementation of the
TLoD are analyzed for different governance stakeholders. With
those additional analyses, we are able to identify whether specific
company or IAF characteristics determine challenges with stake-
holders such as risk management, the compliance function, the C-
Level management, the supervisory board, or the external auditor.
In those additional models, we find heterogeneous results. If the
company is listed there are fewer coordination issues with the
board and external auditors. They seem to be more aware of the
necessity of the implementation. Implementation issues for the
finance industry are pronounced in relation to the compliance func-
tion, the regulator, and the external auditor, which all have a very
defined governance role in those regulated industries. A higher con-
formance with the International Professional Practice Framework
increases the challenges with the compliance function but decreases
those with the external auditor. This finding conforms with some
ideas on duplication of work and efficiency efforts in auditing
(e.g., Abbott et al., 2012; Pizzini et al., 2015). The more assurance-
related tasks are performed, the less there are challenges with the
supervisory board and the regulator. This finding shows the poten-
tial tradeoffs between assurance and consulting tasks for the IAF as
documented by literature (e.g., Hoos et al., 2015; Munro &
Steward, 2010). Coordination challenges might decrease, but
resources are more dedicated to the effectiveness of internal con-
trols compared to process efficiency considerations.
In sum, our study contributes to the literature in multiple ways.
First, we empirically confirm that the TLoD is implemented in most of
our sample companies. Furthermore, we identify determinants that
influence the implementation of the TLoD in a positive or negative
way. We also generate additional insights if specific factors determine
problems (challenges) for the IAF with a specific governance function.
Thus, our results help companies to identify whether a specific chal-
lenge is relevant for their IAFs or not and which specific determinant
might be the most influential factor. Furthermore, our results allow
the IIA or the national chapters to rethink the pros and cons of the
model, especially in the current phase of discussing the update of the
TLoD. For example, the results for finance companies suggest that a
strict interpretation of the TLoD increases implementation challenges.
Therefore, a more relaxed interpretation of the lines, as suggested by
the new proposal, might address these challenges. From an academic
perspective, we contribute to literature since our empirical results
analyze the TLoD in more detail and provide additional insights, but
also raise questions.
Thus, future research can analyze if our results are valid for other
regulatory regimes and countries, since one limitation of our study is
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the focus on three German-speaking countries. Furthermore, the
potential self-perception bias of the participating CAEs can be a poten-
tial limitation, although the survey methodology seems to be a valid
approach to gather data and generate initial results for our research
questions. Nevertheless, future studies can switch the perspective and
analyze the potential challenges of aTLoD implementation through the
lense of the potential stakeholders. Using participants from the IAF or,
for example, the risk management function, an experimental approach
is preferable to isolate the specific factors from a more behavioral per-
spective. A comparison over time with our results promises interesting
insights as soon as enough experiencewith the revised versionwill have
been gathered. Finally, the application of new technologies and the
advent of new, agile organizational approaches, that, for example,
reduce silo thinking, could have consequences for the challenges asso-
ciated with the implementation of theTLoD. Altogether, our study pro-
vides multiple relevant results for the practical and the academic
discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of the TLoD and
opensmultiple avenues for future research.
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ENDNOTES
1 IIA Practice Guides: Coordinating Risk Management and Assurance,
March 2012; Internal Audit and the Second Line of Defense, January
2016; Coordination and Reliance: Developing an Assurance Map,
February 2018. IPPF Standard 2050: Coordination and Reliance, 2017.
2 The survey is used by the national IIAs for benchmarking purposes and
to identify important trends in the profession. The questionnaire is
revised on a three-year basis to include current trends and modify ques-
tions. It includes overall more than 80 questions from different areas of
internal auditing (e.g., structure, reporting, quality management).
Together with the national IIAs, an extensive pretest of the instrument
was conducted with nine CAEs from different organizations. Using feed-
back from these CAEs as well as from the national IIAs, the questions
were aligned with the research topic of this study.
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APPENDIX
Variable Definitions
Variables from the survey Description Question
Dependent variables
TLoDNoChallenges Dummy variable with the value “1” if there
is no challenge and the value “0” if there
is a challenge
Are there any challenges in the
implementation of theTLoD? Answer:
“No”
Diff_Gov_Stakeholders Dummy variable with the value “0” if there
is no challenge and the value “1” if there
is a challenge with the specific Assurance
Provider (Risk Management; Compliance;
C-Level; Supervisory Board; Regulator;
External Auditor)
Are there any challenges in the
implementation of theTLoD? Answer:
“Yes, with … …”
Independent variables
IAF characteristics
ConformanceIPPF Scales from 1 to 5 where 1 if very low
conformance and 5 if conformance is
very high
How is your conformance with the
International Professional Practice
Framework?
AssurancePct Percent of assurance activities
(engagements) from 0 to 100%
What is the percentage of
assurance-related tasks?
PctUnplanned Percent of unplanned audits (engagements)
from 0 to 100%
What is the percentage of unplanned
audits?
Stakeholders relationships
Intensity_SB Scales from 1 to 5 where 1 if low use and
5 if intense use
In your opinion, how intensively are the
results of the IAF's work used from 1 to
5 by the supervisory board?
Intensity_CLevel Scales from 1 to 5 where 1 if low use and
5 if intense use
In your opinion, how intensively are the
results of the IAF's work used from 1 to
5 by the management board?
Company characteristics
LN_IAFStaff Natural logarithm of total full-time
equivalent (FTE) of IAF employees
What is the total number (FTE) of IAF
employees?
Listing 1 for “Listed” and 0 for “Not listed” What is the company's listing status?
Finance 1 for “Credit and financial institutions
including Banks,” “Insurance companies,”
“Pension and social institutions”
and 0 for “Nonfinancial Industry”
Which industry does the company belong
to?
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